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constitutional, in which case the original purpose of that statute
must overshadow any other conceptual analysis in order to bring it
within head 27 of section 91 of the British North America Act; or
the Lord's Day Act is unconstitutional in view of the stress laid on
the secular, economic effects of the statute, a stress which drives
the pith and substance of the statute beyond the authority of the
federal legislature. In the former case the Act would be in plain
conflict with the right preserved by section 2 of the Canadian Bill of
Rights, and in the latter case the whole statute would be ultra vires
the federal legislature as pertaining to property and civil rights.
It is submitted that in view of the apparent religious partiality
of the provisions of the Lord's Day Act, it should be the subject of
close scrutiny with a view to either scrapping the whole Act as
anachronistic and unnecessary or reconciling its provisions with a
realistic interpretation of the Canadian Bill of Rights.
R.J.S.

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, v. Imperial
Oil Ltd. et al., [1963] S.C.R. 584.
HAa.: Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a camel?
POL.: By the mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed.
HAa.: Methinks it is like a weasel.
POL.: It is backed like a weasel.
HAa.: Or like a whale?
POL.: Very like a whale.
Ham~et, mI:2, lines 380 if.

Introduction
The Supreme Court of Canada has decided that a provincial government may legislate to clip the wings of its political opponents. In
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Imperial
Oil Ltd.,' a divided court dismissed the appeal of the Union attacking
the constitutional validity of s. 9(6) (c) (i) and (d) of the Labour
Relations Act of B.C. 2 In so doing it affirmed the unanimous decision
of a five man B.C. Court of Appeal. That Court in its turn had upheld
the decision of Whittaker J. in the B.C. Supreme Court.
On March 27, 1961, subsection 6 was added to section 9 of the
Labour Relations Act. Subsection 6 (c) (i) states:
No trade-union and no person acting on behalf of a trade-union shall
directly or indirectly contribute to or expend on behalf of any political
party or to or on behalf of any candidate for political office any moneys
deducted from an employee's wages under subsection (1) or a collective
agreement, or paid as a condition of membership in the trade-union. 3

As a result the respondent company refused to remit funds in
conformity with an existing collective bargaining agreement with
1 [1963] S.C.R. 584.
2 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 205, as am. by 1961 c. 31.
3Ibid.

204

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 3

the appellant union until the appellant supplied a statutory declaration required by clause d declaring that clause 6(c) would be complied with. The appellants brought an action claiming specific performance of the check-off clause of the collective agreement. The
appellant argued that the legislation requiring such a declaration
was ultravires the Legislature of B.C.
I. Property and Civil Rights: (a) Labour relations

Is the impugned legislation within s. 92(13) of the British
North America Act, 1867,4 the head of property and civil rights?
If the legislation is legislation in relation to labour relations within
a province then it is civil rights legislation. To determine this it
is proper as Martland J. does, to examine and consider "the true
purpose and effect" of the Labour Relations Act. Using the Act as a
whole as a touchstone, we can discover whether the impugned clauses
'fall within the spirit of the Act. This spirit is accurately described by
McDonald J. in a passage cited with approval by Martland J.
To my mind the object of the Act is to facilitate collective bargaining
and stabilize industrial relations by enabling a Union to establish before
the Board its ability to represent a group of employees; . . . generally

to ensure a greater measure of industrial peace to the public. Certification is, of course, not necessary for collective bargaining, but the policy
of the Act 5undoubtedly is to promote it as a means to more orderly
bargaining.

In fact do the impugned clauses contribute to the fulfillment of
the objects outlined above? Does the restriction of the use of union
funds for political purposes "facilitate collective bargaining" or "stabilize industrial relations?" Does it in any way change the conditions
of employment or does it affect the contract of employment? On the
face of it, the answer to all of these questions is unequivocably "no".
However, a sophistic argument might run somewhat like the following: If you restrict the union from contributing to political parties,
then more funds would be available for use in true labour matters.
This argument contains at least two flaws: (1) It concedes that in
fact political activities are not true labour matters. One of the two
grounds relied on by the A.-G. of B.C. in his support of the B.C.C.
of A. decision (affirmed in the instant case) is that it "prevents money
collected by check-off and as a condition of union membership being
diverted from the support of normal union activities in the fund of
labour relations to the more remote field of political activity." 6 (2)
Such legislative decision amounts in fact to a transfer of the internal
control of union policies to the legislature and abrogates the autonomy
of the union. This could have the effect of destroying the independence
of the union and its effectiveness as a bargaining agent.
Martland J. relying heavily on the implications of the decision
in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Therien7 and its inter4 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3.

5 (1952) 29 M.P.R. 377 at p. 396.
6Supra, footnote 1 at p. 603.
7 [1960] S.C.R. 265.
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pretation of the B.C. Labour Relations Act, makes the point that the
ability to create a trade union as a legal entity by certification in
itself gives the legal creator the right to set bounds over its legitimate
activity. If this were not so, one would have the legal creation of a
Frankenstein. The argument runs thus: The Labour Relations Act
of B.C. by providing for certification of trade unions and the valid
assignment of monies by workers of part of their wages to these
certified unions gives the province authority to legislate as to the
uses, the propriety of which would justify the powers derived from
certification.
The legislation which is under attack in the present proceedings in my
opinion does nothing more than to provide that the fee paid as a condition
of membership in such an entity by each industrial employee cannot be
expended for a political object which may not commend his support. That
individual has been
brought into association with the trade union by statutory requirement.5
With respect it is submitted that Martland J. is pushing the legalistic
argument based on the legal creative act to its logical absurdity.
One must quarrel with the importance Martland J. attaches to
the act of certification. Even today uncertified trade unions enjoy
many of the rights which he attributes to certification. These rights
existed prior to labour legislation and were not dependent on the
recognition of unions as a specific legal entity. It is submitted that
his Lordship's argument is improperly based on the analogy of the
creation of a company. Closed shops and collective bargaining are
not legal creations ex nihilo but the result of the historic achievement
of trade-unionism. Martland J.'s argument is an attempt to subsume
a living organism within a convenient legal pigeon-hole. He does
this in order to justify finding that the acts of a trade-union which
have any remote connection with the Labour Relations Act are within
provincial competence.
When the Legislature clothes that entity with wide powers for the exaction of membership fees by methods which previously it did not, in law,
possess, it can set limits to the objects for which funds so obtained may
be applied.9
With respect the ultimate implications of this reasoning spell the
doom of a free trade-union movement. His reasoning could also apply
to any industry such as a utility under the supervision of the Board of
Transport. Since the government must approve a change of rates and
hence is in fact sanctioning the exaction of money for services it is
conceivable that revenue so raised be made subject to control over its
distribution and expenditure.
(b) Civil rights outside the province
One argument raised by counsel at the trial level was that this
legislation interfered with civil rights outside the Province. Here
the local union was under contract within its international parent
Supra,footnote 1 at p. 593.
9Ibid, p. 595.
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union whose head office was in Denver to pay $2 per capita per
month. Section 9 (6) (c) would prevent the local union from fulfilling
its obligations to the parent union because it is a matter of record that
the parent union has contributed to a political party in Canada and
may reasonably be expected to do so in the future. Whittaker J. does
not deny that this contract is enforceable outside the provinces. He
simply asserts that the constitution of the international union does
not provide specifically for the expenditure of funds for political
purposes. He adopts an ostrich-like attitude and says in effect the
local union really cannot be expected to anticipate that the money
will be expended as it has been in the past.
There is authority for the proposition that provinces have not
the right to interfere with civil rights outside the Province. In R. V.
Royal Bank of Canadal0 the Court held that the Province of Alberta
did not have authority to affect the interest payable on bonds which
were held by a bank whose head office was located outside Alberta.
The reason given was that a contract involved civil rights outside the
Province. It is submitted that even if the impugned legislation were
to be regarded as civil rights legislation since it affects the civil rights
of the local union outside the province, that the reasoning in R. v.
Royal Bank of Canada" applies.
(c) Fundamental Political Freedoms
Another branch of Martland J.'s argument is the contention that
if the impugned legislation is not property and civil rights because it
is labour legislation that it is still property and civil rights if characterized as legislation in relation to the fundamental political freedoms of individuals. It was submitted by the appellants that only the
Federal Parliament could pass legislation in relation to the fundamental political rights of individuals. Martland J. rejected this submission thus:
I do not agree with this contention. It is the very fact that provincial
legislation, in some instances, has apparently sought to derogate from
fundamental political freedoms which has led to the expression of the
view by
some members of the Court, in cases such as the Alberta LegisZation-l2 case and ,Sitzman v. Elbling,13 that it could not be regarded
as falling within the sphere of property and civil rights in the Province,
within s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act. The same reasoning does not apply to
legislation which seeks to protect certain civil rights of individuals In
[1913] A.C. 283.
'1 Ibid., at p. 298. "Their right was a civil right outside the Province and
the Legislature of the Province could not legislate validly in derogation of
10

that right ....

In the opinion of their Lordships the effect of the Statute of

1910, if validly enacted, would have been to preclude the bank from fulfilling
its legal obligation to return their money to the bondholders, whose right to
this return was a civil right which had arisen, and remained enforceable outside the Province. The Statute was on this ground, beyond the powers of the
Legislature of Alberta, inasmuch as what was sought to be enacted was
neithertoconfined
to propertly
civilorrights
within
the Province
norper
directed
solely
matters
of merely and
local
private
nature
ithin it."
Lord
Haldane.
12 [1938] S.C.R. 100.
13 [19573 S.C.R. 285.
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a Province from interference by other persons also in that Province.
Legislation of that kind appears to me to be legislation in respect of
civil rights within the Province.1 4

Martland J.'s argument is cast in the form of a tautology. First
he asserts that legislation which derogates from fundamental political
freedom is not within property and civil rights. Then he equates the
words fundamental political freedoms with civil rights. He proceeds
to substitute civil rights for fundamental political freedoms and he
concludes that legislation which protects civil rights in the province
is legislation in respect of civil rights in the province. No authority
is cited by him for the proposition that the derogation from fundamental political freedoms is not property and civil rights whereas
the protection of the same fundamental political freedoms is within
property and civil rights.
Apart from asserting that the ratio of Switzman v. Elbling1 5 was
that the legislation there was ultra vires the province as criminal
law, he contends that the three judges who relied on the reason of
"interference with freedom of speech and expression essential to the
democratic form of government established in Canada' 16 were merely
striking down the legislation because it was a derogation from fundamental political freedoms. There is no logical inference that the same
judges would uphold provincial legislation which sought to protect
fundamental political freedoms. It is difficult to imagine that anyone
would be interested in contesting such a protective declaration so
that Martland's view besides being a non sequitur is strictly speculative.
It was on these judgments that a commentator on the Swiztman
case suggested that the Court was evolving a Bill of Rights and "a
valuable bulwark of democratic freedom against legislative invasion."'17
in Switzman v. EThling' s Kellock J. incorporated part of his judgment in the Saumur 9 case. He approved there a distinction recognized by Mignault J. between civil rights, political rights and public
rights. As well he approves the passage of Duff C.J. in Re AZberta Legislation2o which expresses the view that the B.N.A. Act
presumes the existence of parliamentary institutions. Abbott J. in
his dissent in the instant case relies on his former opinion in
Switzman v. Elbling.21 There he expressed the view albeit by way
of obiter that free discussion as a fundamental political right could
not be infringed even by the Parliament of Canada. "I am of opinion
that as our constitution Act now stands parliament itself could not
abrogate this right of discussion and debate."2 2 His view depends on
14

Supra,footnote 1 at p. 596.
13.
Supra,footnote 1 at p. 595.
17 (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev. 554 at p. 557.
IS Supra, footnote 13.
19 [19532 2 S.C.R. 299.
20
2 Supra, footnote 12.
1 Supra,footnote 13.
22 hid, at p. 328.
115
6 Supra,footnote
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his approval of Duff C.J.'s assertion that the B.N.A. Act presumes
the existence of parliamentary institutions.
The three dissenting judges in the instance case stress the importance of the Switzman 23 case as decided by Kellock, Rand and
Abbott JJ. Rand J. in his judgment in the Switzman case decided
squarely on the grounds that the impugned legislation was a threat
to the institutions presumed and approved by the preamble to the
1867 Act. It is a commitment to a specific kind of political society.
The political theory within the Act is that of parliamentary government, with all its social implications, and the provisions of the statute
elaborate that principle in the institutional apparatus which they create
or contemplate, whatever the differences in its working Canadian government is in its substance the will of the majority expressed directly
or indirectly through popular assemblies. This means ultimately government by the free public opinion of an open society the effectiveness
of
which, as events have not infrequently demonstrated is undoubted.2 4

It is possible that with the judgment of Martland J. this emerging jurisprudence has for the moment been suspended or been used
in a perverse fashion. Fauteux, Taschereau and Ritchie JJ. it may
be inferred subscribe to Martland J.'s view of the legislative competence of a provincial legislature to legislate for the protection of
political and public rights under the head of property and civil rights.
If they subscribe to the further statement that the provincial legislatures could not derogate from these political and public rights, which
accounts for former decisions of the Court declaring invalid legislation
which infringed on fundamental rights, then the problem emerges
that they recognize the Court as a protector of these rights, the
destruction of which would be above either legislative body. At issue
here is the concept of legislative sovereignty. The orthodox position
is that complete power to legislate on any matter vests in either the
provincial legislature or the parliament of Canada. (Except of course
amendment to the B.N.A. Act.) So every law may be passed as long
as the competent legislative body has dealt with it. If the protection
of fundamental political rights is in the legislative competence of
the province, then orthodox constitutional theory demands that it
also be within the competence of the province to derogate from
these. rights. Unless this is so, paradoxically Martland J.'s remarks
amount in fact to an approval of Abbott J.'s natural law interpretation of the B.N.A. Act.
The orthodox theory would fall if Martland J.'s interpretation of
provincial competence in civil and property rights were extended to
other heads of sections 91 and 92.
What Martland J. fails to do is to characterize properly the subject matter under consideration. It is contended that fundamental
political freedoms, both derogation and protection thereof, have
been carved out of the head of property and civil rights and regarded
under the orthodox view as within the competence of the federal
23
24

bid.

Ibid.. at p. 306.
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government (either under peace order and good government or under
the residual power vested in the federal government).
This has been achieved by the distinction of separating fundamental political rights in their quality as public and/or political rights
from the all inclusive definitions given to property and civil rights.
See Saumur,215 per Mignault J.
Even if one accepts Martland J.'s contention that the province
cannot derogate it is asserted that properly characterized the nature
of the instant legislation indicates an attempt on the part of the
British Columbia legislature to derogate from the fundamental freedom of participation in political activity by a trade-union.
Martland J. focuses on what he regards as the compromise of
the fundamental rights of individuals which is recognized by the
labour legislation under consideration. He does not examine the collective rights of the union which are cut down by this legislation.
The union exists outside the narrow province of labour legislation.
In this extra-legislative life, as it were, it should have the rights to
engage in activities which in the view of the leadership advances
the interests of the trade union. In the political control of Canadian
life the emphasis has shifted from the isolated support of individuals
to the organized activity of special interest groups. It is unacceptable
to try to limit the scope of a labour union's activity so that it is precluded from achieving its ends through political means. In no sense
does union use of members' dues for political purposes preclude the
individuals from free participation in politics. This legislation is fatal
26
for union political activity.
With respect, the impugned legislation is correctly characterized
by Judson J. when he puts it thus:
...that the questioned clauses . . are in relation to the political activity
of trade unions is an accurate characterization of this legislation. The
subject-matter of the legislation concerns political and constitutional rights
not property rights. In the result this legislation does what Martiand J.
says provincial legislation cannot do; namely, it derogates from the
fundamental political rights of groups to participate in political activities.27
To prohibit this group political activity in the political context today
is to undermine the operation of parliamentary institutions whose
existence is presumed in the B.N.A. Act.
25

Supra, footnote 19.

26 It must be pointed out that generally speaking moneys contributed by

means of check-off or as a condition of membership make up practically the
entire income of a trade union. In the case before us money so paid made up
more than 99.8% of the union's total revenue for the year preceding the issue
of the writ. Taking these figures into consideration it is easily seen that this
legislation which prohibits more than 99.8% of the total union revenue certainly prevents the union from practically speaking engaging in political
activities
by contributing to the party of its choice.
27
Supra, footnote I at p. 604.
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II. Is the impugned legislation federal election legislation?
The last argument which Martland J. rejects is that the legislation in question encroaches a field reserved to the federal parliament,
viz., federal elections. He does not deny that the impugned legislation
relates to federal elections. However, he contends that you cannot
argue from the existing statutory prohibition of an act, that subsequent repeal will have the effect of enabling the act. Former Federal
Elections Acts contained provisions [Stat. Can. 1930, c. 16, s. 9]
[R.S.C. 1927, c. 53, s. 36] which forbade contribution of funds by companies or associations. These sections were subsequently repealed. The
real issue is the effect of this repeal. Martland J. considers the repeal
has no effect whatever as to the rights of the bodies considered in the
repealed legislation to contribute. This view is difficult to accept. If
a statute prohibiting an act is repealed, then it must follow that the
act is no longer prohibited. So, if companies and association did not
have the legal right to contribute prior to the statute, then the prohibition would be senseless and unnecessary. A sounder view of the
effect of the repeal is suggested by Judson J.:
The CanadaElections Act, 1960, c. 39, contemplates in terms broad enough
to include a trade union the making the contributions to and expenditures
on behalf of political parties and candidates for political office. This provincial legislation is really a re-enactment against trade unions in British
Columbia of the former prohibition contained in the Dominion Elections
Act and repealed in 1930.28

In contrast to this Martland J. contends that the right of a company
or association to contribute to a federal election depends in some
cases on the powers conferred on them by provincial legislation. It
is submitted that the provincial legislature would have no authority
to confer any powers in the field of federal elections. We submit on
the authorities, federal elections is an exclusive field for the parliament of Canada. In another place (supra) Martland J. has stated the
proposition that the power to enable an act implies the power to
prohibit it. It is submitted that the converse in logic must follow,
viz., the power to prohibit implies the power to enable. Only in the
unorthodox view that some rights may be enabled but not derogated
from-a view which incorporates a natural law theory within the
B.N.A. Act, is it possible to reject the proposition that the power to
prohibit implies a power to enable. Before the prohibition was in
the Act one must presume that it was lawful for companies and
other organizations to contribute to support of political parties in
federal elections. The prohibition inserted in the Act was a declaration that this field of human activity fell within the legislative competence of parliament. And this is so just as forcefully as if the legislation had been enabling. The repeal does not remove the activity
from the legislative competence of parliament, nor does it invite
encroachment by another legislative body.
28S bid., at p. 605.
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It is instructive to pull together the threads of Martland J.'s reasoning. First, in addressing himself to the restriction of funds raised
through check-off, he points out the condition of union membership
has a statutory sanction. "The Legislature which confined the statutory right could also take it away again, and if the right can be eliminated entirely, in my opinion it is equally possible for the legislature
to apply limitation in respect of the exercise of power thus created." 29
This states the proposition that the power to enable implies the power
to prohibit wholly or in part.
In his analysis of the significance of Switzman v. Elbing ° on
the classification of fundamental political rights as properly within
property and civil rights, Martland J. states the proposition that
legislation which protects fundamental political rights will qualify
as property and civil rights. Abbott, Rand and Kellock JJ. indicate
in Martland J.'s view that the derogation from these fundamental
political rights is not intra vires the province as property and civil
rights. Hence the inference to be drawn here is that the province
which can protect fundamental political freedoms cannot derogate
therefrom. Putting it in the terms used to describe the former legislation, it is competent to the province to pass enabling legislation on
fundamental political freedoms, but it is not competent to the province to prohibit wholly or in part from a subject matter so curiously
within its competence.
Finally in his examination of the effect of the repeal of s. 9 of
the Canda E/ections Act, 1930, Martland J. states that you cannot
infer from a power to prohibit a power to enable. In other words,
although it may be within the federal competence to prohibit certain
conduct relating to a subject matter, there is no necessary inference
that it would be within the federal competence to enable such conduct.
This proposition the reader will recognize as the inverse of that
derived from his lordship's interpretation of Switzman v. EMlbing.31
Martland J. uses these three variations of the significance of
legislative competence. With respect, if such specialized approaches
to legislative competence are permitted to apply in going from one
subject matter to another in the Britisk North America Act the whole
thing will collapse with all its involutions and convolutions. It is submitted the very niceness of Martland J.'s reasoning derives from the
eclectric nature of his logic. A proposition applies to some statutory
enactments, but not so to others.
The characterization of human activity for constitutional purposes is as tricky as Hamlet's cloud; so much, for better or for worse
depends on the eye of the beholder. To us the legislation looks most
like legislation in relation to political activity including federal
elections.
A.A.G.
29

30

31

Ibid., at p. 592.

Supra, footnote 13.
Ibid.

